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Abstract 
The general rule in South Africa is that, when an offence is committed, the suspect has to 
be prosecuted by a public prosecutor. However, there is an exception whereby a victim of 
crime is permitted to institute a private prosecution if the prosecutor has declined to 
prosecute. South African law allows natural, but not juristic, persons to institute private 
prosecutions. In the case examined in this note, the appellant argued that the law 
prohibiting juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that private prosecutions are only permitted on grounds of 
direct infringement of human dignity. This note argues that section 7 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act is unconstitutional for excluding juristic persons from instituting private 
prosecutions and recommends steps the appellant could take to institute private 
prosecutions against those who mistreat animals.  
 
Introduction 
The general rule in South Africa is that, when an offence is committed, the suspect has to 
be prosecuted by a public prosecutor. This is on the basis of section 179 of the South 
African Constitution and section 20 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.1 However, 
as an exception to this general rule, where a victim of crime has no legal capacity, he / she 
or his / her representative is permitted to institute a private prosecution if the prosecutor 
has declined to prosecute.2 This is on the basis of section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
(CPA),3 which provides: 
 
“(1) In any case in which a Director of Public Prosecutions declines to prosecute for an 
alleged offence – (a) Any private person who proves some substantial and peculiar 
interest in the issue of the trial arising out  of  some  injury which he individually suffered 
in consequence of the commission of the said offence; (b) a husband, if the said offence 
                                                 
1 Act 32 of 1998. 
2 The prosecution policy of the National Prosecuting Authority provides for circumstances in which a public 
prosecutor may not prosecute an alleged offender even if there is evidence that he / she committed the offence 
in question. See “Prosecution policy” (2014), available at: 
<https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Prosecution%20Policy%20%28Final%20as%20Revised
%20in%20June%202013.%2027%20Nov%202014%29.pdf> (last accessed 20 March 2017). 
3 Act 51 of 1977. 
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was committed in respect of his wife; (c) the wife or child or, if there is no wife or child, 
any of the next of kin of any deceased person, if the death of such person is alleged to have 
been caused by the said offence; or (d) the legal guardian or curator of a minor or lunatic, 
if the said offence was committed against his ward, may, subject to the provision of 
section 9 and section 59(2) of the Child Justice Act, 2008, either in person or by a legal 
representative, institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of such offence in any court 
competent to try that offence.” 
 
Another type of private prosecution in South Africa is private prosecution by statutory 
right under either the CPA4  or other specific legislation.5  Some statutes such as the 
National Environment Management Act and the Attorneys Act allow juristic persons to 
institute private prosecutions. However, it is beyond the scope of this note to discuss 
private prosecutions by statutory right. 
 
In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development the Supreme Court of Appeal, commenting on section 7 of 
the CPA, observed that, “[t]he statutory provisions regulating private prosecution have 
been in place for almost 100 years”.6 South African courts have held in several decisions 
that a victim of crime has a right to institute a private prosecution.7 Unlike in some 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, Kenya and Canada where juristic 
persons may institute private prosecutions,8 courts in South Africa have held that section 
7 of the CPA cannot be interpreted as empowering juristic persons to institute private 
prosecutions. It is against this background that the National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals has approached the courts and argued, so far unsuccessfully, that 
section 7 of the CPA is unconstitutional for violating its right to equality. On 4 December 
2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, in National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, that the 
appellant did not have the right to institute a private prosecution because “private 
prosecutions in terms of s 7 of the CPA are only permitted on grounds of direct 
infringement of human dignity. This is the reason for s 7(1)(a) of the CPA and for the 
exclusion of juristic persons other than those mentioned in s 8 from instituting private 
prosecutions”.9 The purpose of this note is to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning in this case is debatable. Specifically, the author argues that section 7 of the 
CPA is unconstitutional for excluding juristic persons from instituting private 
prosecutions. The author recommends some steps that could be explored by the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to enable it to institute private 
                                                 
4 Id, sec 8. 
5 See for example: National Environmental Management Act (Act No 107 of 1998), sec 33; Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, Act No 19 of 1998, sec 8; Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act 1997, sec 23; and Attorneys Act, 1979, sec 46A. 
6 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2016 1 SACR 308 (SCA), para 8.  
7 See for example: Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2014 (1) SACR 
111 (GNP), para 190; Nundalal v Director of Public Prosecutions KZN and Others (AR723/2014) [2015] 
ZAKZPHC 28 (8 May 2015), paras 53–54; Delport and Others vS [2015] 1 All SA 286 (SCA), 2015 (1) SACR 620 
(SCA), para 31; and Reynolds NO v Beinash and Another [1998] JOL 2274 (W) at 6. 
8 See generally JD Mujuzi “The right to institute a private prosecution: A comparative analysis” (2015) 4 
International Human Rights Law Review 222.  
9 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 28. 
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prosecutions against those who mistreat animals. It is important first to highlight other 
decisions, in chronological order, in which courts have held that juristic persons have no 
right to institute private prosecutions. 
 
Excluding juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions 
As mentioned above, section 7 of the CPA does not expressly state that a juristic person 
may not institute a private prosecution. In Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v 
Black the court dealt for the first time in South Africa with the issue of whether a 
company was “entitled to bring a private prosecution”10 under section 7 of the CPA. The 
applicants had argued that the word “person” in section 7 included a juristic person. Their 
argument was based on the fact that, because the CPA did not define “person”, the court, 
on the basis of one of the rules of statutory interpretation,11 had to rely on the definition of 
that word in section the 2(b) of the Interpretation Act.12 This section provides  that,  
unless  the  context  requires  otherwise,  the  word  “person” includes “any company 
incorporated or registered as such under any law”. In disagreeing with the applicant’s 
submission, the court held: 
 
“There are two clear points of distinction. In the first place we are not here concerned 
with a situation where the statute simply refers to a ‘person’. The word ‘person’ does not 
stand alone. It is necessarily qualified by the word which immediately precedes it. What 
we have to decide is what was meant by the words ‘private person’ in the context of s 7 … 
Furthermore, s 7(1) provides that any person referred to in (a), (b), (c) or (d) may institute 
and conduct a prosecution ‘… either in person or by a legal representative’ and it would, I 
think, be straining language to speak of a company instituting and conducting a 
prosecution ‘in person’. In fact [the applicant] conceded that the use of the word ‘private’ 
in the phrase ‘private person’ precluded the inclusion of the classes of persons referred to 
in subpara (a) of the definition of ‘person’ in the Interpretation Act, namely ‘any divisional 
council, municipal council, management board, or like authority’. That does not of course 
mean that the remainder of the definition cannot be applied … If, however, one applies to 
s 7(1)(a) only that part of the definition of the word ‘person’ which includes a company, 
the section will then read ‘any private person including any company incorporated or 
registered as such under any law, who proves’ etc. Quite apart from the linguistic 
awkwardness of using the pronoun ‘who’ to refer to a company, the question would then 
arise as to whether the word ‘private’ also governs [a] company. Prima facie it would, in 
which case the section would apply only to private companies. This would create an 
anomaly since there would seem to be no reason in principle why a private company 
should be able to prosecute and a public company should not.”13 
 
The court concluded that: 
 
“The general policy of the legislature is that all prosecutions are to be public prosecutions 
in the name and on behalf of the State … The exceptions are firstly where a law expressly 
confers a right of private prosecution upon a particular body or person (these bodies and 
                                                 
10 Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black 1990 (4) SA 720 (A) at 721. 
11 DG Kleyn and F Viljoen Beginner’s Guide for Law Students (4th ed, 2010, Juta) at 56. 
12 Act 33 of 1957. 
13 Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees, above at note 10 at 724. 
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persons being referred to in section 8(2)) and secondly, those persons referred to in 
section 7. There may well be sound reasons of policy for confining the right of private 
prosecution to natural persons as opposed to companies, close corporations and 
voluntary associations such as, for example, political parties or clubs.”14 
 
It should be recalled that Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black was decided 
before the 1996 South African Constitution (the Constitution) which, inter alia, provides 
that juristic persons, like natural persons, also have rights under the Constitution. Section 
9 of the Constitution provides for the right not to be discriminated against. It was on the 
basis of section 9 that the applicant in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another15 challenged 
the constitutionality of section 7 of the CPA as interpreted in Barclays Zimbabwe 
Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black. In the High Court the applicants argued that section 7 was 
discriminatory and therefore contrary to section 9 of the Constitution. Apart from 
agreeing with the reasoning in Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black, the High 
Court held that: “not all rights in the Bill of Rights are for the benefit of juristic persons. 
Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides that a juristic person is entitled to the rights in 
the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that 
juristic person. For example, rights to life and to human dignity cannot sensibly be 
applied to juristic persons.”16 
 
The court added that what the Constitution prohibited was unfair discrimination and, to 
determine whether the discrimination in question is unfair, the following criteria have to 
be used: “(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have been 
victims of past patterns of discrimination; (b) the nature of the provision and the purpose 
sought to be achieved by it; and (c) the extent to which the discrimination has affected the 
interests or rights of the complainant”.17 In the light of these criteria, the court held that: 
 
“Taking into account these guidelines, it appears that (a) above more appropriately 
applies to natural persons. However, insofar as it may be applicable to the applicant I 
have already indicated above that the applicant should be regarded as a public body. I am 
not aware whether the applicant is a victim of past patterns of discrimination. As far as 
(b) above is concerned, the nature of section 7 and the purpose thereof have already been 
considered above. It constitutes an exception to the constitutional imperative stipulated 
in section 179 of the Constitution. The purpose is, inter alia, to afford a way of vindicating 
‘imponderable interests’ and to curb the propensity to resort to self-help if there is a 
refusal by the Director of Public Prosecutions to institute a prosecution. To put it 
differently, the purpose of section 7 is to allow a private prosecution only where private or 
personal interests are at stake, but to prevent other natural persons, as well as juristic 
persons, not having such interests from doing so. To allow all persons to undertake a 
private prosecution would be contrary to the constitutional imperative and would 
effectively create an alternative prosecuting system. As far as (c) above is concerned, the 
following should be pointed out. First, in considering the effect or extend [sic] of section 
                                                 
14 Id at 726. This principle was also emphasized in Reynolds v Beinash 1998 JDR 0510 (W). 
15 (29677/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 763 (8 October 2014). 
16 Id, para 19. 
17 Id, para 24. 
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7(1)(a) one must take into account that not only juristic persons are excluded, but also 
other natural persons not referred to in the section. The right to institute a private 
prosecution is determined by a limitation clause which does not only differentiate 
between juristic and natural persons, but also between natural persons. Second, the 
criteria applied to achieve this differentiation are not arbitrary, but to serve a particular 
purpose, i.e. to exclude persons not having a personal interest linked to some injury 
individually suffered.”18 
 
The court also held that, in the light of the fact that section 179 of the Constitution 
provides that South Africa shall have a single prosecuting authority, it was necessary “to 
strictly control the right of private prosecution”.19  It was against this decision that the 
applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
As had been the case in the High Court, the appellants argued in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal that section 7(1)(a) of the CPA was unconstitutional because it: 
 
“[D]ifferentiates between natural persons on [sic] one hand and juristic persons on the 
other hand. There is no good reason for differentiating between the two classes of 
persons. As a result, the differentiation fails to serve a legitimate governmental purpose 
and is therefore irrational and noncompliant with the rule of law as an articulated 
standard in s 1(c) of the Constitution. Further, the differentiation fails to render both 
natural and juristic persons equal before the law and specifically denies juristic persons 
equal benefit of the law rendering the impugned provision non-compliant with the 
articulated standard in s 9(1) of the Constitution.”20 
 
The appellant submitted that the court should excise the word “private” from the CPA.21 
However, the respondents did not make submissions contesting the appellant’s 
arguments and, as a result, the court observed that “[i]t is unfortunate that the 
respondents failed to deal with the merits and provide this court with the rationale for the 
limitation of private prosecutions” 22 . After discussing the relevant jurisprudence on 
equality and the fact that section 9 of the Constitution applies to juristic persons as it does 
to natural persons, the court observed that: 
 
“Counsel for the appellant properly conceded that the regulation of private prosecutions is 
a legitimate governmental purpose. Therefore, the question is whether the provisions of s 
7(1)(a) of the CPA are rationally connected to this purpose. The rationality threshold is 
low. The connection must not be arbitrary but must be based on a reason that does not 
have to be the most efficient or the only reason. Put differently, the question is whether 
there is an acceptable reason for the limitation of private prosecutions contained in s 
7(1)(a). This question must be answered within the context of the whole of s 7 and s 8 of 
                                                 
18 Id, paras 25–26. 
19 Id, para 27. 
20 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 6. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Id, para 29. 
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the CPA, s 179 of the Constitution and the provisions of the N[ational] P[rosecuting] 
A[uthority] Act.”23 
 
The court then dealt with the role of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the 
circumstances in which a public prosecutor’s decision whether or not to prosecute may be 
reviewed by either the national director of public prosecutions (DPP) or the courts.2424 It 
is against that background that it held that, “[i]t follows that a decision of the prosecuting 
authority not to prosecute, which of course is a prerequisite for a private prosecution in 
terms of s 7(1) of the CPA, must be made for a good reason. Against this background the 
conclusion that private prosecutions should be limited to exceptional cases, cannot be 
faulted. The exceptions are those found in subsecs 7(1) and 8 of the CPA”.25 
 
Implied in this reasoning is that a victim of crime has three options should the 
prosecuting authority decide not to prosecute the alleged perpetrator: approach the 
national DPP and ask him to review and set aside the prosecutor’s decision not to 
prosecute; approach a court of law to have the decision reviewed; or institute a private 
prosecution. The court also held that “[t]he effect of s 7(1) of the CPA is to permit private 
prosecutions only where private and personal interests are at stake”. 26  The court 
concluded that: 
 
“In the final analysis, private prosecutions in terms of s 7 of the CPA are only permitted 
on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity. This is the reason for s 7(1)(a) of the 
CPA and for the exclusion of juristic persons other than those mentioned in s 8 from 
instituting private prosecutions. Human dignity is a foundational value of our 
Constitution. To allow for private prosecutions other than in terms of s 8 of the CPA only 
on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity, is for the reasons mentioned, 
rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of limitation of private 
prosecutions. I therefore find that s 7(1)(a) of the CPA is not unconstitutional.”27 
 
This article now analyses the court’s ruling. 
 
Analysis 
The most important reason why the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals approached the courts is because it would like to institute private prosecutions 
against people who allegedly mistreat animals. The challenge is that, unlike some 
legislation that empowers juristic persons to institute private prosecutions,28 the Societies 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act29  does not empower the National Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to do so. One has to revisit history to understand 
why this organization does not have the right to institute private prosecutions. In 
                                                 
23 Id, para 19. 
24 Id, paras 20–24. 
25 Id, para 25. 
26 Id, para 26. 
27 Id, para 28. 
28 See above at note 5. 
29 Act No 169 of 1993. 
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National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that: 
 
“In the context of the prevention of cruelty to animals, the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 8 of 1914 (the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act) applied. This Act was 
repealed by the Animal Protection Act in 1962. Before its repeal, s 12 of the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals [Act] authorised the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals 
[sic] to privately prosecute offenders … It appears therefore that historically, the 
predecessor of the appellant had the right specially conferred by statute, to privately 
prosecute offenders. This power is not conferred by the Animal Protection Act or the 
[Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals] Act.”30 
 
The court did not explain why the Animal Protection Act and the Societies for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act do not confer on the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals the power to institute a private prosecution. This could 
be the reason why some commentators have argued that one of the options available to 
the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals is to approach Parliament to 
amend “the [Animal Protection Act] to reintroduce the power of the National Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to institute private criminal proceedings which was 
in the 1914 Act but which lacuna was probably inadvertently omitted from the 1962 Act”.31 
It is argued that the drafting history of the 1962 Animal Protection Act does not support 
the submission that power for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals to institute private prosecutions “was probably inadvertently omitted from the 
1962 Act”. The drafting history shows that it was a conscious decision by the then minister 
of justice and members of Parliament, “fully” supported by the then Federation of 
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.32 It should be recalled that the Animal 
Protection Bill was tabled before the National Assembly as a private member’s bill in 
February 1962.33 Section 13(1) of the bill provided that: “[a]ny Society for the prevention 
of cruelty to animals which is registered under … the Act, may, by any person authorized 
thereto in writing under the hand of the chairman or secretary thereof, prosecute for any 
offence against this chapter and the provisions of any law relating to private prosecutions 
shall apply to all such prosecutions.”34 
 
The then minister of justice objected, inter alia, to the inclusion in the act of a provision 
empowering the societies to institute private prosecutions. He submitted that: 
 
“This principle that private individuals should be allowed to bring prosecutions in the 
courts without restriction is not one which I can accept. Hon members will realize at once 
what it may lead to and what repercussions it will eventually have. The usual safety valve 
as far as private prosecutions are concerned namely, that it is only when the Attorney-
General and the prosecutor have refused to prosecute and have given a certificate to that 
                                                 
30 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 11. 
31 G Fraser and V Fraser “If only the SPCA were a company …” (9 December 2015) Legal Brief 
Today. 
32 Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) (11 May 1962) at 5516. 
33 Id at 916. It was introduced by Hon Gay. 
34 Id at 929. 
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effect, that the private individual can go to court, does not apply here. The principle 
contained in this section is not one which I can accept.”35 
 
Because of the minister of justice’s objections to the bill, including regarding private 
prosecutions, the bill was withdrawn at a later stage.36 After almost three months, it was 
reintroduced in Parliament after the section on private prosecutions had been deleted.37 It 
is against this background that the minister of justice submitted that: “Hon members will 
recall that in the other Bill there was … a principle in respect of private prosecutions. That 
principle has now been excluded from this Bill. I tell my [H]on members that the 
Federation of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals fully approves of that 
principle not being included in it”.38 
 
It is against that background that the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was 
deliberately deprived of the power to institute private prosecutions. It should also be 
recalled that the drafting history of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Act is silent on why the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals does not 
have the power to institute private prosecutions.39 As mentioned earlier, in National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the appellant did not have the right 
to institute a private prosecution because “private prosecutions in terms of s 7 of the CPA 
are only permitted on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity. This is the reason 
for s 7(1)(a) of the CPA and for the exclusion of juristic persons other than those 
mentioned in s 8 from instituting private prosecutions”.40 It is argued that this reasoning 
by the court is debatable, at least for the reasons outlined below. In order to put the 
discussion in context, it is apposite to repeat what section 7(1)(a) of the CPA states. It 
provides that “[i]n any case in which a Director of Public Prosecutions declines to 
prosecute for an alleged offence - any private person who proves some substantial and 
peculiar interest in the issue of the trial arising out of some injury which he individually 
suffered in consequence of the commission of the said offence” may institute a private 
prosecution. 
 
The first point to make is that section 7(1)(a) is not limited to offences that infringe 
human dignity. It is applicable to “any case” that the DPP has declined to prosecute. 
Whether or not the offence in question has infringed the victim’s human dignity is not a 
pre-condition for a person to institute a private prosecution. Case law from South African 
courts shows that private prosecutions have been brought against people who have 
committed offences that have nothing to do with infringing the right to human dignity. 
These have included cases where someone sought to enforce the payment of a debt,41 and 
prosecuting the accused for submitting or relying on a false affidavit and making a false 
declaration.42 Of course there have also been cases where private prosecutions have been 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Id at 1217. 
37 Id at 5515. 
38 Id at 5516. 
39 Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) (25 November 1993) at 14064–89. 
40 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 28. 
41 Phillips v Botha 1999 (2) SA 555 (SCA); [1999] 1 All SA 524 (A). 
42 Nundalal, above at note 7. 
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brought against people who committed offences that directly infringed the victim’s 
human dignity. These have included, for example, cases of rape. 43  Therefore, the 
argument that the infringement of the right to human dignity is a prerequisite for the 
institution of a private prosecution is too restrictive and not supported by South African 
case law on private prosecutions. Another challenge is that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
does not explain how the right to institute private prosecutions relates to the direct 
infringement of human dignity. Although the South African Constitutional Court has 
handed down several decisions on human dignity,44 it has been argued that “we can be 
less certain of the meaning of the concept”.45 This is because “the Constitutional Court has 
not ventured a comprehensive definition of human dignity”.46 One would have expected 
the court to explain in concrete terms the direct relationship between human dignity and 
private prosecutions.  Before linking private prosecutions under section 7 to human 
dignity, the court first observed that “[t]he effect of s 7(1) of the CPA is to permit private 
prosecutions only where private and personal interests are at stake”.47 Although juristic 
persons do not have “personal” interests, it can hardly be argued that they do not have 
private interests to protect as victims of crime. 
 
The judgment is not clear on the legitimate government purpose for limiting private 
prosecutions generally and to natural persons in particular. The judge is very clear that 
the appellant had no problem with the need for the government to regulate private 
prosecutions. This should be understood against the background that, according to the 
Constitution and to the National Prosecuting Authority Act it is the NPA that has 
responsibility to prosecute all alleged offenders. This means that private prosecutions are 
an exception, as they have been since their introduction in South Africa.48 The appellant’s 
argument was simple: why should the right to institute private prosecutions not also be 
extended to an association that protects the rights of animals where there is evidence that 
the NPA has declined to prosecute people who have committed offences against animals? 
However, it would appear from the comprehensive discussion of the NPA’s role that the 
court was of the view that the purpose is to ensure that all prosecutions in the country are 
conducted by public prosecutors. In Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black, the 
court did not state the legitimate government purpose why the right to institute private 
prosecutions should not be extended to private companies. The court stated that, “[t]here 
may well be sound reasons of policy for confining the right of private prosecution to 
natural persons as opposed to companies, close corporations and voluntary associations 
such as, for example, political parties or clubs”.49 In National Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the 
government made no submissions relating to the rationale behind limiting the right to 
private prosecutions under section 7 of the CPA to natural persons. As the court observed 
“[i]t is unfortunate that the respondents failed to deal with the merits and provide this 
court with the rationale for the limitation of private prosecutions”.50 This meant that the 
                                                 
43 Bothma v Els and Others 2010 (2) SA 622 (CC); 2010 (1) SACR 184 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
44 I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th ed, 2013, Juta) at 250–57. 
45 Id at 251. 
46 Ibid. 
47 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 26. 
48 Records of the Cape Colony (vol 21, 1827) at 124–25. 
49 Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees, above at note 10 at 726. 
50 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 29. 
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court did not have the benefit of knowing the government’s position on the issue. This 
could be an indication that the government does have a valid reason why juristic persons 
should be prevented from instituting private prosecutions. 
 
As mentioned above, section 7 of the CPA does not expressly state that juristic persons 
shall not institute private prosecutions. It is the Supreme Court of Appeal (previously the 
Appellate Division) that has interpreted it as excluding juristic persons from instituting 
private prosecutions. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal relied on a 
judgment that was handed down before the Constitution had been enacted. It is argued 
that section 7 of the CPA, as interpreted to exclude juristic persons from instituting 
private prosecutions, is unconstitutional for violating the right to equality under section 
9(3) of the Constitution. Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination. For 
any discriminatory act to pass constitutional muster, it has to be justified under section 
36 of the Constitution, which provides that: 
 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
The judgment is silent on whether prohibiting juristic persons from instituting private 
prosecutions could be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. It has been argued 
that: 
 
“Once it is established that a law of general application infringes a right protected by the 
Bill of Rights, the State or the person relying on the law may argue that the infringement 
constitutes a legitimate limitation of the right. Rights [some of them] are not absolute. 
They may be infringed, but only when the infringement is for a compellingly good reason. 
A compellingly good reason is that the infringement serves a purpose that is considered 
legitimate by all reasonable citizens in a constitutional democracy that values human 
dignity, equality and freedom above all considerations.”51 
 
In the light of the fact that there are no compelling reasons why juristic persons should 
not be permitted to institute private prosecutions under section 7 of the CPA, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to justify such a limitation in the light of the jurisprudence 
emanating from South African courts on section 36.52 If there is a fear that juristic 
persons may abuse private prosecutions, there are safeguards in place to ensure that they 
do not do so. These include: the requirement that such prosecutions shall not be 
instituted without a certificate from the DPP; the fact that the DPP retains the right to 
take over a private prosecution for the purpose of continuing with it or stopping it; and 
that courts have the power to prevent any private prosecutor from abusing his right to 
                                                 
51 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights, above at note 44 at 171–72. 
52 Id at 150–75. 
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institute a private prosecution. In a nutshell, there is no justifiable reason  why  juristic  
persons  should  not  be  permitted  to  institute  private prosecutions. 
 
Another difficulty with the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment is its heavy reliance on the 
case of Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black. Although the court in this case 
dealt with the issue of juristic persons to institute private prosecutions, the facts of the 
two cases are distinguishable. This is because in Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd 
v Black a private company had instituted a private prosecution for its private gain: to have 
the person who had committed an offence against it punished and for the company to 
recover its money. On the other hand, in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development the appellant brought a 
private prosecution in the interest of the public, to protect animals and reduce animal 
cruelty. If the appellant is not permitted to institute private prosecutions against those 
whom the DPP has declined to prosecute for committing crimes against animals, this 
means that those who commit such offences will escape the consequences of their 
criminal acts. This is because the victims, that is the animals, for obvious reasons cannot 
bring a private prosecution; the owners are in most cases their abusers and therefore will 
not prosecute themselves; and the animal rights organizations have been barred from 
instituting private prosecutions. 
 
One important issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal seems to have settled relates to the 
issue of a certificate before an individual institutes a private prosecution. It should be 
recalled that section 7(2)(b) of the CPA provides that “[t]he [DPP] shall, in any case in 
which he declines to prosecute, at the request of the person intending to prosecute, grant 
the certificate referred to in paragraph (a)”. In 2009 a single High Court judge held that, 
before the DPP can issue a certificate to a victim of crime to institute a private 
prosecution, he had to be satisfied that the applicant has a substantial and peculiar 
interest in the matter.53 In 2015 another High Court decision (of the full court) held that 
the court and not the DPP must be convinced that the applicant has a substantial and 
peculiar interest in the matter.54 In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that “[t]he prosecuting authority is obliged to furnish a certificate called nolle 
prosequi to someone who wishes to prosecute privately”.55 
 
Some people have argued that, had the applicant in this case been a company, the court 
would probably have come to a different conclusion.56 This is because, the authors argue, 
section 19(1)(b) of the Companies Act provides that a company “has all of the legal powers 
and capacity of an individual”. In order to appreciate this argument, it is important to 
reproduce section 19(1). This section provides, inter alia: 
 
“From the date and time that the incorporation of a company is registered, as stated in its 
registration certificate, the company – (a) is a juristic person, which exists continuously 
                                                 
53 Singh v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another (5072/05) [2006] ZAKZHC 20 (5 
May 2006). 
54 Nundalal, above at note 7. 
55 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, above at note 6, para 9. 
56 Fraser and Fraser “If only the SPCA”, above at note 31. 
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until its name is removed from the companies register in accordance with this Act; (b) has 
all of the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that - (i) a juristic 
person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any such capacity; or (ii) the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.” 
 
It could be argued that, notwithstanding section 19, companies still do not have the right 
to institute private prosecutions. This is for two reasons. First, by the time the Companies 
Act was enacted, jurisprudence from South African courts was very clear that companies 
did not have the power to institute private prosecutions. If the legislature wanted to 
confer this power on companies, it would have stated so expressly in the Companies Act. 
Secondly, section 19(1)(b) provides that a juristic person “has all of the legal powers and 
capacity of an individual, except to the extent that – (i) a juristic person is incapable of 
exercising any such power”. There are at least two ways in which a juristic person may be 
incapable of exercising a power: where it is incapable of exercising the power because of 
the nature of the power; and where the incapacity to exercise the power is a result of a law 
that prohibits the company from exercising the power. This means that the law makes the 
company incapable of exercising the power although the company would have been able 
to exercise the power had the law not prevented it from doing so. In other words, any 
attempt by the company to exercise the power would be unlawful. This is the case with 
private prosecutions. 
 
Conclusion 
In the light of these arguments, the following options are submitted to enable juristic 
persons to institute private prosecutions in South Africa. The first is for the appellant to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court for the court to settle the matter once and for all. 
However, the challenge with this option is that there is no guarantee that the 
Constitutional Court will hold that juristic persons have a right to institute a private 
prosecution. Nevertheless, this option is worth pursuing. According to section 167 of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over constitutional matters57 and 
in any matter that “raises an arguable point of law of general public importance which 
ought to be considered by that Court”. 58 Commenting on its jurisdiction, the 
Constitutional Court recently held that: 
 
“[16] This Court has not yet determined the full scope of its new jurisdiction or 
definitively granted leave to appeal on the basis of section 167(3)(b)(ii). Reduced to bare 
essentials, this section provides for this Court to grant leave if – (a) the matter raises an 
arguable point of law; (b) that point is one of general public importance; and (c) the point 
ought to be considered by this Court.  [17] What is the import of the words ‘which ought to 
be considered by that Court’ in section 167(3)(b)(ii)? Although a point of law may be both 
arguable and of general public importance, there may be factors that militate against its 
receiving the attention of this Court. It seems to me that, on this, some of the factors that 
are of relevance to the interests of justice factor in the context of our jurisdiction based on 
constitutional matters may find application [sic]. [18] To summarise, a holding that a 
matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance does not inexorably 
                                                 
57 Constitution, sec 167(3)(b)(i). 
58 Id, sec 167(3)(b)(ii). 
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lead to a conclusion that the matter must be entertained. Whether the matter will, in fact, 
receive our attention will depend on the interests of justice, a subject I deal with later.”59 
 
It is argued that the appellant’s case not only raises a constitutional issue, that is, whether 
the fact that juristic persons are not permitted to institute private prosecutions is contrary 
to section 9 of the Constitution, it also “raises an arguable point of law of general public 
importance which ought to be considered by that Court”.60 The point in question is 
whether there is a legitimate reason to prohibit juristic persons from instituting private 
prosecutions. This is an important issue in the light of the facts that: juristic persons are 
also sometimes victims of crime who may wish to prosecute those who have committed 
offences against them, should the state decline to prosecute; some of them, for example 
the appellant in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, play vital public roles such as protecting 
animals from abuse; and that, in many jurisdictions, including some in Africa, laws 
permit juristic persons to institute private prosecutions. This means that the government 
would have to justify why in a democratic society, such as South Africa, juristic persons 
should still be barred from instituting private prosecutions. 
 
The other approach would be for the legislature to amend the relevant legislation and 
expressly empower private companies and other juristic persons to institute private 
prosecutions. This has already been done in the past, for example by inserting section 49A 
into the Attorney’s Act to empower the Board of Control to institute private 
prosecutions.61  Amending or enacting legislation expressly to empower juristic persons to 
institute private prosecutions would settle this issue once and for all. The third option 
would be to challenge the validity of the public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. 
Although the Constitution and the NPA Act are very clear that prosecutors are supposed 
to be independent and prosecute without fear, favour or prejudice, there is growing 
jurisprudence from South African courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeal,62 to the 
effect that a public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution 
is not beyond scrutiny. The decision may be challenged on grounds including 
irrationality, illegality and unreasonableness. Where a public prosecutor’s decision not to 
prosecute has been set aside, the charges in question are automatically reinstated. As the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held in National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v 
Freedom Under Law: 
                                                 
59 Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Limited 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC), paras 16–18. 
60 In Mashongwa v PRASA (CCT03/15) [2015] ZACC 36 (26 November 2015), para 15, the court held that “this 
application raises a constitutional issue. It also raises an arguable point of law of general public importance 
relating to PRASA’s legal obligations to protect its rail commuters from harm”. 
61 Sec 49A provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of sec 76, the board of control may, by any person 
authorized thereto in writing by the chairperson, and upon written notice to the society of the province 
concerned, institute a private prosecution for the misappropriation 
or theft of property or trust money, and the provisions of section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 
51 of 1977), and any other law relating to private prosecutions shall apply to such prosecution as if the board of 
control is a public body.” 
62 See for example: National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 
(SCA), 2014 (2) SACR 107 (SCA), [2014] 4 All SA 147 (SCA); Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2009] 1 All SA 54 (N), 2009 (1) BCLR 62 (N); and Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others (19577/2009) [2016] ZAGPPHC 255 (29 April 2016); Acting National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance In Re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others (19577/09) [2016] ZAGPPHC 489 (24 June 2016). 
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“[The] doctrine [of separation of powers] precludes the courts from impermissibly 
assuming the functions that fall within the domain of the executive. In terms of the 
Constitution the [National DPP] is the authority mandated to prosecute crime … As I see 
it, the court will only be allowed to interfere with this constitutional scheme on rare 
occasions and for compelling reasons … The setting aside of the withdrawal of the 
criminal charges … [has] the effect that the charges … are automatically reinstated and it 
is for the executive authorities to deal with them.”63 
 
In the author’s opinion the most viable option would be for the legislation to be amended 
expressly to empower juristic persons to institute private prosecutions.64 
 
 
                                                 
63 Freedom Under Law, para 51. 
64 On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court did not address the issue of the constitutionality of sec 7 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act because it did not consider it to be a live dispute. See National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another 2017 (1) 
SACR 284 (CC), para 63. 
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